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1. Introduction
According to John Dewey’s famous words—toward the end of Experi-
ence and Nature (1929)—philosophy can be characterized as the “critical
method for developing methods of criticism”. We should appreciate the
way in which pragmatism is indebted to, or is even a species of, critical
philosophy, presumably not exactly in Immanuel Kant’s original sense of
this term but in a developed sense that still retains something from the
Kantian idea of criticism, especially the idea of the reflexivity essential to
human reason-use and inquiry. It is through inquiry itself that we can
(only) hope to shed light on what it means to inquire. Philosophy is an
inquiry into inquiry, and this is a fundamentally Kantian critical point.
“Der kritische Weg ist allein noch offen”, Kant wrote when concluding his
first Critique.
The relationship between Kant and pragmatism can and should be
critically considered not only in general terms but also through specific
instances. In this essay, I will first make some broad remarks on the rel-
evance of Kantian critical philosophy as a background of pragmatism,
especially pragmatist philosophy of religion. I will then examine the
ways in which Kantian issues are present in the distinctive way in which
William James—at the very core of his development of the pragmatic
method—takes seriously the reality of evil and suffering, developing a
thoroughly antitheodicist philosophical outlook. However, I will also con-
nect this theme with another development in more recent neopragmatism
that might prima facie be taken to be far from any Kantian issues, namely,
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Richard Rorty’s ironism, as it emerges from his reading of George Orwell’s
Nineteen Eighty-Four. I am not claiming Rorty to be a critical philosopher
in a Kantian sense, but I am confident that even the context of pragmatist
inquiry within which his liberal ironism is developed owes fundamental
points of departure to Kantian transcendental philosophy. Finally, I will
show how a worry regarding what might be considered a potential slip-
pery slope from James to Rorty arises from the Kantian background of
pragmatist antitheodicism.
I am in this essay to some extent helping myself to, and partly summa-
rizing, some of my previous work on these topics.1 We will begin from
an overall view of the Kantian roots of what I am calling the “pragmatist
protest” in the philosophy of religion and then move on to James’s prag-
matic method and antitheodicism, and finally to Rorty and Orwell—and,
simultaneously, to what I take to be the inevitably Kantian dimensions of
pragmatist inquiry into suffering. While defending a generally “Kantian”
view of pragmatism, I of course acknowledge that many pragmatists have
been, and continue to be, highly critical of Kant in various ways (as a
number of other contributors to this volume rightly emphasize). Thus, we
may regard my Kantian reading of pragmatism as a hypothesis to be crit-
ically and self-critically tested through a continuous conversation among
pragmatists, Kantians, and their various opponents.
In this essay, I propose to examine this hypothesis by specifically ap-
plying my Kantian account of pragmatism to the philosophy of religion,
and even more specifically to the theodicy vs. antitheodicy issue. Ac-
cordingly, the general remarks on the relations between Kant and prag-
matism to be made here are only intended as attempts to sketch the
context, or background, within which my defense of a pragmatist-cum-
Kantian antitheodicism unfolds. Hopefully, this rather specific case study
also demonstrates the wide-ranging relevance of Kantian explorations
of pragmatism (or, conversely, pragmatist explorations of Kant), even
though here I must leave many central issues undiscussed (see further,
e. g., Kivisto¨ and Pihlstro¨m 2016).
2. The pragmatist protest and its Kantian roots
It may be argued that it is, to a significant extent, the Kantian nature of
pragmatism, as well as the ability of pragmatism to critically reinterpret,
1 Cf. e. g., Pihlstro¨m 2010, 2013, 2017, 2018; and Kivisto¨ and Pihlstro¨m 2016, especially
chapter 5.
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transform, and further develop some key Kantian ideas, that makes prag-
matism a highly relevant philosophical approach today—in, e. g., meta-
physical and epistemological discussions of realism and idealism, ethics
and axiology, the philosophy of religion, and many other fields. In earlier
work, I have articulated some central aspects in which pragmatism, early
and late, can be regarded as a Kantian philosophy, focusing on the nature
of metaphysics, the relation between fact and value, and religion.2
James, to be sure, saw philosophical progress as going “around” Kant
instead of going “through” him. Undeniably, pragmatists have defended
non- or even anti-Kantian views regarding various philosophical prob-
lems: contrary to Kant’s universalism and apriorism, pragmatism tends
to emphasize the contingent practice-embeddedness of knowledge, moral-
ity, and value. However, pragmatism—even James’s—also shares crucial
assumptions with Kant’s critical philosophy, to the extent that Murray
Murphey (1966) aptly called the classical Cambridge pragmatists “Kant’s
children”. Recent scholarship has extensively covered the Kantian back-
ground of pragmatism and the affinities between pragmatism and tran-
scendental philosophical methodology.3 In this essay, we obviously can-
not do justice to the richness of the question concerning the pragmatists’
relation to Kant—either historically or systematically. One may, however,
shed light on this topic by exploring this relation through the case of prag-
matist philosophy of religion and its relation to one of the fundamental ideas
of Kant’s philosophy of religion, i. e., the postulates of practical reason, as
well as the more specific case of the theodicy issue (on which the later
sections of this essay will focus).
As is well known, Kant transformed and transcended various contro-
versies and dichotomies of his times, critically synthesizing, e. g., ratio-
nalism and empiricism, realism and idealism, determinism and freedom,
as well as nature and morality. Similarly, pragmatism has often been de-
fended as a critical middle ground option. For James, famously, prag-
matism mediates between extreme positions, in particular the conflicting
temperaments of the “tough-minded” and the “tender-minded”. In the
philosophy of religion, in particular, one may also find Kantian aspects
of pragmatic approaches in, e. g., the problems of theism vs. atheism and
2 See the references in note 1. Note that, when speaking of “Kantian” philosophy, I primar-
ily mean philosophy derived from and based on, albeit not necessarily identical to, Kant’s
philosophy (rather than, more broadly, something corresponding to the entire (post-)Kantian
tradition in philosophy).
3 See several essays in Gava and Stern 2016.
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evidentialism vs. fideism. For virtually no pragmatist can religious faith
be said to be a strictly evidential issue on par with scientific hypotheses.
Evidence plays only a relatively marginal role in religion, as religion has
to do with the way in which one understands and relates to one’s life as
a whole. According to Kant as well as pragmatism, religion must be inti-
mately connected with the ethical life. We can pursue moral theology, not
theological ethics: religion cannot be the ground of ethics but must itself
be grounded in the requirements of morality.
One may, then, employ both Kantian and pragmatist insights in order
to argue that the theism vs. atheism issue is not exhausted by the narrowly
intellectual (evidentialist) considerations one might advance in favor of ei-
ther theism or atheism. This is because one needs the resources of Kantian
practical reason—the kind of ethically driven use of reason that pragmatists
have arguably seen as pervading human reason-use generally—in order
to arrive at any humanly adequate reaction to this problem. Theism might,
the Kantian pragmatist may argue, be rationally acceptable in terms of
practical reason, or more generally from the standpoint of the vital human
needs and interests embedded in practices of life; nevertheless, this is very
different from the kind of justification standardly aimed at in evidentialist
philosophy of religion. Moreover, justification in terms of practical reason
might, as Kant insisted, be the only rational justification available for the
religious believer. From a Kantian and pragmatist point of view, faith in
God need not be made scientifically acceptable, or warranted in terms of
religiously neutral criteria of reason (that is, either empirically verifiable
or epistemically justified in a broader sense) because it is ultimately not
a matter of science or theoretical reason; the crucial task is to make it
ethically acceptable.
Pragmatist philosophy of religion (especially James’s) can be seen as
reinterpreting and further developing Kant’s postulates of practical rea-
son, i. e., the freedom of the will, the existence of God, and the immortal-
ity of the soul. It is, in particular, from the perspective of the pragmatist
proposal to (re-)entangle ethics and metaphysics that this Kantian topic
deserves scrutiny. One may ask whether the defense of the postulates in
the Dialectics of Kant’s second Critique leads to a metaphysical position ac-
cording to which God exists. Here the pragmatist may suggest that Kant’s
postulates are, again, both metaphysical and ethical—with metaphysical
and ethical aspects inextricably intertwined.
Although this is not Kant’s own way of putting the matter, one may
say that the postulates presuppose that the world is not absolutely inde-
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pendent of human perspectives but is responsive to human ethical (or
more generally valuational) needs and interests, or (in a Jamesian phrase)
“in the making” through such needs and interests. Human beings struc-
ture reality, including religious reality, in terms of what their commit-
ment to morality requires; there is no pre-structured, “ready-made”world
that could be meaningfully engaged with. It remains an open question
whether, or to what extent, this structuring is really metaphysical. Some
interpreters prefer a purely ethical, “merely pragmatic”, account of the
Kantian postulates. Is there “really” a God, or is one just entitled to act
“as if” there were one? This question needs to be pursued by pragmatists
as much as Kantians.
Kant (1990 [1781/1787], a 795/b 823 ff.; 1983 a [1788], a 223 ff.) con-
structs his moral argument for the existence of God and the immortality
of the soul in the “Canon of Pure Reason” and the Dialectics of the second
Critique. As mere ideas of pure reason (“transcendental ideas”), the con-
cepts of freedom, God, and the soul lack “objective reality”. At best, they
can be employed regulatively, not constitutively. This, however, is only the
point of view that theoretical, speculative reason offers to the matter. From
the perspective of practical reason—which, famously, is ultimately “prior
to” theoretical reason in Kant’s (1983a [1788], a 215 ff.) system—there is a
kind of “reality” corresponding to these concepts. Their epistemic status,
when transformed into postulates of practical reason, differs from the sta-
tus of the constitutive, transcendental conditions of any humanly possible
experience, i. e., the categories and the forms of pure intuition, explored in
the “Transcendental Analytic” and the “Transcendental Aesthetic” of the
first Critique. The latter kind of conditions necessarily structure, accord-
ing to Kant, the (or any) humanly cognizable world, that is, any objects or
events that may be conceivably encountered in experience. However, the
postulates of practical reason also structure—in an analogical albeit not
identical manner—the human world as a world of ethical concern, delib-
eration, and action. Yet, this “structuring” is not “merely ethical” but also
metaphysical.
From a pragmatist point of view, as much as from the Kantian one,
ethics and metaphysics are deeply entangled here. Religion, or theism, is
pragmatically legitimated as a postulate needed for morality, for ethical
life and practices. Yet, no theological ethics in the style of, say, divine
command theory can be accepted. What is needed, according to both
Kant and pragmatists like James, is moral theology. Any attempt to base
ethics on theology, or religion, would (in Kantian terms) be an example of
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heteronomy instead of autonomy, but the only critical and rational way to
provide a basis for theology is the ethical way.
The Kantian pragmatist needs to consider a problem here, though.
Is theism practically legitimated a priori, as in Kant, or does it receive
its legitimation empirically or psychologically, as an attitude “energiz-
ing” moral life, because we are the kind of beings we are, as in James
and perhaps other pragmatists? One possible suggestion is that, just as
Kantian transcendental (critical) philosophy synthesizes the pre-critically
opposed epistemological doctrines of empiricism and rationalism, and
just as pragmatism (arguably) bridges the gap between facts and values
(see Putnam 2002), one may try to reconcile Kantian (transcendental) and
Jamesian (pragmatist, empirical, psychological) ways of justifying theism
ethically. The Kantian perspective on theism needs pragmatic rearticu-
lation, and the thus rearticulated pragmatic aspects of theism are not
disconnected from the Kantian transcendental work of practical reason
(cf. further Pihlstro¨m 2013).
It is part of such rearticulation to perceive that Kant’s criticism of theod-
icies as rationalizing attempts to provide reasons for God’s allowing the
world to contain evil and suffering can also be reread from the stand-
point of pragmatist (especially Jamesian) attacks on theodicies (to be soon
explored in some more detail). It is precisely the Kantian perspective of
practical reason that can be argued to be central to an adequate philosoph-
ical analysis of the problem of evil and suffering. For Kant as well as the
pragmatists, there is something seriously wrong in approaching human
suffering from the point of view of speculative metaphysical or theologi-
cal theorizing. Hence, the controversy between theodicy and antitheodicy
is at the core of the pragmatist protest—with its Kantian roots—we should
develop further in the philosophy of religion. I will now move on to a
more elaborated account of this issue.
It is not an accident that Kant is the starting point for both pragmatist
criticisms of metaphysical realism and for pragmatist criticisms of theodi-
cies, as both are crucial in the project of critical philosophy continued by
pragmatism. From the pragmatist as well as Kantian perspective, theod-
icies commit the same mistake as metaphysical realism: they aim at a
speculative, absolute account (from a “God’s-Eye-View”) of why an om-
nipotent, omniscient, and absolutely benevolent God allows, or might al-
low, the world to contain apparently unnecessary and meaningless evil
and suffering. Kantian critical philosophy denies the possibility of such a
transcendent account or such metaphysical, speculative truths—and this
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denial is itself, again, both ethical and metaphysical, followed by James’s
firm rejection of any theodicies as insensitive to the irreducibility of other
human beings’ suffering.
Why, we may here pause to ask, am I speaking about the pragmatist
“protest” in the title of this section? This is simply because we can see
pragmatism as protesting against various received views of mainstream
philosophy of religion today, such as metaphysical realism, evidentialism,
and theodicism, all of which are typically maintained by leading analytic
philosophers of religion—but also against various tendencies in contem-
porary “postmodern” or “Continental” philosophy of religion, such as
radical anti-metaphysics, constructivism, and relativism. We will next
study this protest in relation to a special case, the theodicy vs. antitheodicy
controversy. It should be emphasized that protest needs critique: it is one
thing to simply abandon some position or protest against it, and quite an-
other to base one’s protest on a careful critical analysis and argumentation.
In the case of critical philosophy, this particularly means self-criticism and
self-discipline.4 The pragmatist version of this idea is the Deweyan view
of philosophy as a critical method for developing methods of criticism.
In this fundamental sense, even Deweyan pragmatists (despite Dewey’s
occasionally sharp attacks on Kant) continue the Kantian critical project—
and this is even more clearly so with James, whose antitheodicist protest
we will now examine.
3. James, the pragmatic method, and the reality of evil
To properly set the stage for the inquiry into the problem of evil and
suffering, I will begin from James’s views on the pragmatic method and
metaphysics, elaborating on the kind of Kantian reading of James already
hinted at in the previous section. I will then suggest that the problem of
evil and suffering plays a crucial role in James’s philosophy of religion,
metaphysics, and the pragmatic method—and it is this problem, in partic-
ular, that needs to be examined in relation to its Kantian background.
James famously argued that in every genuine metaphysical dispute,
some practical issue is, however remotely, involved. If there is no such
issue involved, then the dispute is empty. Jamesian pragmatism is thus
here both influenced by and in contrast with the Kantian (somewhat proto-
pragmatist) idea of the “primacy of practical reason” in relation to theo-
4 Compare this to Kant’s (1990 [1781/1788]) articulation of the idea of the “discipline of
reason” in the “Doctrine of Method” (Methodenlehre).
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retical reason. As we just saw, for Kant, the metaphysical ideas of God,
freedom, and immortality are only vindicated by the practical, instead of
theoretical, use of reason. The Jamesian pragmatist, however, goes beyond
Kant in emphasizing not simply the “primacy” of ethics to metaphysics
but their profound inseparability and entanglement. Pragmatist inquiries
into metaphysical topics, such as James’s, lead to the radical claim that
metaphysics might not, in the last analysis, even be possible without a
relation to ethics: pragmatically analyzed, we cannot arrive at any un-
derstanding of reality as we humans, being ourselves part of that reality,
experience it, without paying due attention to the way in which moral
valuations and ethical commitments are constitutive of that reality by be-
ing ineliminably involved in any engagement with reality possible for us.
Ethics, then, plays a “transcendental” role constitutive of any metaphysi-
cal inquiry we may engage in.
More specifically, ethics seems to function as a ground for evaluat-
ing rival metaphysical hypotheses and for determining their pragmatic
core meaning. The (conceivable) practical results the pragmatist meta-
physician should look for are, primarily, ethical. Examples of such ethical
evaluation of metaphysical matters can be found in the Jamesian prag-
matic search for a critical middle path between implausible metaphysical
extremes, as discussed in the third lecture of Pragmatism, “Some Meta-
physical Problems Pragmatically Considered” (James 1975–88 [1907]). The
topics James there (and in the fourth lecture in which the analysis contin-
ues) considers include debates over substance, determinism vs. freedom,
materialism vs. theism, monism vs. pluralism, and (somewhat indirectly)
realism vs. nominalism. Some of these metaphysical examples are quite
explicitly ethical. Such are, for instance, the dispute between determin-
ism and free will, as well as the one between materialism and theism,
which the philosopher employing James’s pragmatic method examines
from the point of view of what the rival metaphysical theories of the
world “promise”: how does, for instance, the conceivable future of the
world change if theism, instead of materialism (atheism), is true, or vice
versa? In Lecture iii of Pragmatism, James argues, among other things, that
theism, unlike materialism, is a philosophy of “hope”, because it promises
us a world in which morality could make a difference.5
5 It might be suggested that there are many less grandiose metaphysical issues that do
not seem to manifest the kind of Jamesian entanglement of ethics and metaphysics that I am
here emphasizing. For instance, is there some specifically ethical dimension involved in the
metaphysical question concerning the existence of tables and the “grounding” of their exis-
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In this context, I want to draw attention to a very important special
way in which ethics is prior to, or contextualizes, any humanly possi-
ble metaphysical (and, arguably, theological) inquiry in Jamesian pragma-
tism. Recognizing the reality of evil is a key element of James’s pluralistic
pragmatism and its conceptions of religion and morality. The critique of
monism, especially the attack on monistic Hegelian absolute idealism, is a
recurring theme in James’s philosophy. An investigation of the problem of
evil can show how he argues against monism and defends pluralism on an
ethical basis and how, therefore, his pragmatic metaphysics is grounded
in ethics in a Kantian manner.
James was troubled by the problem of evil already at an early stage of
his intellectual career, during the time of his spiritual crisis in 1870. He
felt that the existence of evil might be a threat to a “moralist” attitude
to the world, leading the would-be moralist to despair. “Can one with
full knowledge and sincerely ever bring one’s self so to sympathize with
the total process of the universe as heartily to assent to the evil that seems
inherent in its details?” he wondered, replying that, if so, then optimism is
possible, but that, for some, pessimism is the only choice.6 Already at this
stage, he saw a problem with the idea of a “total process” optimistically
taken to be well in order. According to Ralph Barton Perry (1964, 122),
both optimism and pessimism were impossible for James, because he was
“too sensitive to ignore evil, too moral to tolerate it, and too ardent to
accept it as inevitable”. It is already here that we can find the seeds of
his melioristic pragmatism, which he later developed in more detail. This
view says, in short, that we should try to make the world better, fighting
against evil, without having any guarantee that the good cause will win,
but having the right, or perhaps even the duty, to hope that it might and
to invest our best efforts to make sure it will.
James worked on these issues throughout his life. In his last book,
Some Problems of Philosophy (1911), he offered several arguments against
tence? (I am indebted to an anonymous referee’s comment here.) Certainly there is no need
to force such a question into any explicitly ethical shape, but in principle any metaphysical
issue, even the most banal or everyday one, could turn out to be ethically highly significant,
according to Jamesian pragmatism. I try to develop this idea in Pihlstro¨m 2009.
6 Notebook sheets from 1870, quoted in Perry 1964, 120–1. Here James saw that fighting
evil—holding that “though evil slay me, she can’t subdue me, or make me worship her”
(ibid., 121)—presupposes the freedom of the will, and was thus connected with the key prob-
lem of his spiritual crisis. (Freedom, of course, is necessary, according to James, for any
serious ethical philosophy. Perry notes that “moralism” is just one name for what might be
described as James’s “fundamental seriousness”; see ibid., 388.)
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monism, among them the argument that monism creates, and will not be
able to solve, the problem of evil:
Evil, for pluralism, presents only the practical problem of how to get
rid of it.
For monism the puzzle is theoretical: How—if Perfection be the sour-
ce, should there be Imperfection? If the world as known to the Ab-
solute be perfect, why should it be known otherwise, in myriads of
inferior finite editions also? The perfect edition surely was enough.
How do the breakage and dispersion and ignorance get in?
James 1911, 138.7
That pragmatists, unlike monists, must take evil and imperfection seri-
ously, refusing to “be deaf to the cries of the wounded” (as James put it
elsewhere), is presented as one of the ethical motivations grounding the
entire pragmatist method in the first lecture of Pragmatism. Referring to
the actual fate of some suffering people, such as (drawing from a publi-
cation by Morrison I. Swift, an anarchist writer) an unemployed and in
various ways disappointed and discouraged sick man who found his fam-
ily lacking food and eventually committed suicide, James argued, against
“the airy and shallow optimism of current religious philosophy” (James
1975–88 [1907], 20), that what such desperate human beings experience
“is Reality”: “But while Professors Royce and Bradley and a whole host
of guileless thoroughfed thinkers are unveiling Reality and the Absolute
and explaining away evil and pain, this is the condition of the only beings
known to us anywhere in the universe with a developed consciousness of
what the universe is” (ibid., 21).
Thus, idealist, optimistic philosophers “are dealing in shades, while
those who live and feel know truth” (ibid., 22); a Leibnizian theodicy pos-
tulating a harmony of the universe is “a cold literary exercise, whose
cheerful substance even hell-fire does not warm” (ibid., 20). What I am
calling theodicism is, for James, part of the “unreality in all rationalistic
systems” of “religious” philosophy that remain “out of touch with con-
crete facts and joys and sorrows” (ibid., 17). James here even quotes at
length from Leibniz’s The´odice´e (ibid., 19–20), concluding that “no realistic
image of the experience of a damned soul had ever approached the por-
tals of his mind” (ibid.,20). In order to overcome the ethically unbearable
7 I am here quoting from the Bison Books Edition of James’s Some Problems of Philosophy
(1911), ed. Ellen Kappy Suckiel (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1996).
Generally, I am referring to James’s works in the standard way, citing the critical edition
(James 1975–88).
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condition of the philosophical (and theological) tradition of theodicism,
James offers pragmatism as a philosophy that can, pluralistically, respond
to a variety of experiences, including genuine loss and evil, without simply
tolerating such experiences, and without entirely losing the consolation of
religion with the abandonment of theodicies (cf. ibid., 23). It is from this
antitheodicist challenge that Pragmatism, like pragmatism, unfolds.
We should take seriously the fact that James uses the notion of truth
in this context, as well as terms such as “fact”, “reality”, “unreality”, and
“realistic”. His invoking the concept of truth in particular is not just a non-
technical loose way of speaking but, I submit, an instance of his pragmatist
account of truth in action. We must, in particular, take James’s concern
with the truth of pluralism (and the falsity of monism and absolute ideal-
ism) in his own pragmatic sense, the same sense in which he speaks about
“living” and “feeling” people knowing “the truth” (ibid., 20, cited above).
This is truth not in the sense of metaphysical realism postulating a corre-
spondence relation holding (or failing to hold) independently of human
beings and their needs and interests, but a pragmatic truth dynamically
emerging from human valuational practices of engaging with reality and
their experiences of it.
Nevertheless, it would be highly misleading to claim that James would
not be interested in the question about the “real” (genuine, objective) truth
of (say) pluralism (vs.monism), or other metaphysical views he considers
in Pragmatism and elsewhere—just as it would be misleading to claim that
Kant would not be interested in the truth of theism, for instance. Certainly
truth plays a role here, and neither James nor Kant subscribes to an easy
antirealism or relativism according to which the truth (vs. falsity) about
evil and suffering (or about God) would simply be a human perspectival
construction, yet our human practice-embedded perspectives can never
be eliminated from our serious consideration of these truths, and this is
where the Kantian and the Jamesian approaches to the philosophy of reli-
gion join forces. Indeed, it can be suggested that the special moral signifi-
cance of the pragmatist conception of truth (and reality), as articulated by
James in Pragmatism (and elsewhere), arises from the fundamental link be-
tween antitheodicism and the acknowledgment of truth and reality along
the phrases just quoted. We (pragmatically) need the pragmatist concep-
tion of truth in order to make sense of this demand of acknowledgment of
the reality of pain and suffering. A non-pragmatic (e. g., metaphysically
realistic correspondence) notion of truth just cannot do the job. Moreover,
it is, from the Jamesian perspective, a kind of “fake news” based on an
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unconcern with truth to claim, with theodicists, that there “really” is no
unnecessary or meaningless evil, or that suffering has some “real” sense
or purpose.
Well, why couldn’t a realist correspondence-theoretician “acknowledge”
the reality of (meaningless) suffering in the antitheodicist sense? I am not
claiming that a non-pragmatic realist correspondence-theorist cannot be
an antitheodicist. I am, rather, only suggesting that the full force of prag-
matist antitheodicism can be brought into view by realizing the way in
which something like a pragmatic notion of truth functions in the Jame-
sian pronouncements on the concrete reality of suffering that needs to
be acknowledged if we do not wish to “live in shades” and be out of
touch with human experience. Such valuational truths about suffering
are among the pragmatically relevant truths that we, according to James,
seem to need a rich pragmatic notion of truth to account for.
James’s pragmatist and pluralist position might now be summarized
as an outcome of a transcendental argument in a quasi-Kantian fashion.
Our taking seriously the reality of evil—i. e., its psychological, social, as
well as metaphysical reality—is understood by James to be a necessary
condition for the possibility of ethically meaningful or valuable life (in
a pluralistic metaphysical setting), including any true religious meaning
one may find in one’s life. Evil itself is not intrinsically, metaphysically,
necessary to the universe itself, as the absolute idealist would be forced
to hold, but it is necessary in a presuppositional sense: if there is any legiti-
mate role for religious (theistic) beliefs to play in our lives, such a system
of beliefs must acknowledge the reality of evil while resisting the “cor-
rupt”, immoral idea that an ultimately moral creator “planned” it and is
prepared to pay the price in order to secure some greater good. There
is, admittedly, an air of circularity in this argument, because the ethical
duty not to overlook others’ suffering can hardly itself be grounded in any
deeper ethical demand. Ultimately, then, this quasi-transcendental argu-
ment is about what makes morality meaningful and serious for us, and
how it is possible for us to adopt the moral point of view on the world and
on our lives. The circularity, I think, is unavoidable in the sense that to be
concerned with this meaningfulness of the moral perspective is already to
adopt that perspective and to be seriously committed to viewing our lives,
including our philosophizing, from a moral standpoint. The problem of
evil and suffering is, if my argument is on the right track, at the center of
this commitment.
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Furthermore, it may be suggested that the metaphysical acceptance of
the reality of evil and the fight against it constitute a pragmatic criterion
of adequacy for pragmatism itself. Pragmatism proves to be a philosophy
which takes evil seriously, without hiding it or trying to explain it away
(as monistic idealism does, according to James), yet encouraging us to join
in a struggle against it, melioristically trying to make our world a better
one. This is a reflexive pragmatic argument in favor of pragmatism and
pluralism themselves. By enabling us to make a difference, pragmatism
offers a more satisfactory picture of the nature and role of evil in human
lives than monistic idealism (or, mutatis mutandis, some contemporary an-
alytic philosophers’ evidentialist theism typically postulating a theodicy).
The price to be paid here, however, is an irresolvable metaphysical and
theological insecurity: there is no final solution to the problem of evil,
as new experiences of ever more horrendous evils may eventually even
make it impossible for us to go on actively fighting against evil. Insofar as
a pragmatic defense of pragmatism is available, such a defense will have
to remain fallible. We may be unable to react pragmatically to the problem
of evil, after all, and for many thinkers this may be a ground for rejecting
religious beliefs altogether.
According to this Jamesian antitheodicy, the recognition of genuine
evil is required as a background, or as I prefer to say, a transcendental
condition, of the possibility of making a difference, a positive contribu-
tion, in favor of goodness. It should be relatively clear on the basis of
these discussions that the problem of evil can be seen as a frame that puts
the other philosophical explorations of James’s Pragmatism into a certain
context. It shows that reacting to the problem of evil—and the highly indi-
vidual experiences of being a victim to evil that we may hear in the “cries
of the wounded”—is essential in our ethical orientation to the world we
live in, which in turn is essential in the use of the pragmatic method as a
method of making our ideas clear, both metaphysically and conceptually
(and even religiously or theologically). Pragmatism, as we saw, opens the
project of advancing a melioristic philosophy with a discussion of the con-
crete reality of evil, and in the final pages James returns to evil, suffering,
loss, and tragedy:
In particular this query has always come home to me: May not the
claims of tender-mindedness go too far? May not the notion of a
world already saved in toto anyhow, be too saccharine to stand? May
not religious optimism be too idyllic? Must all be saved? Is no price
to be paid in the work of salvation? Is the last word sweet? Is all ‘yes,
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yes’ in the universe? Doesn’t the fact of ‘no’ stand at the very core of
life? Doesn’t the very ‘seriousness’ that we attribute to life mean that
ineluctable noes and losses form a part of it, that there are genuine
sacrifices somewhere, and that something permanently drastic and
bitter always remains at the bottom of its cup?
I cannot speak officially as a pragmatist here; all I can say is that
my own pragmatism offers no objection to my taking sides with this
more moralistic view, and giving up the claim of total reconciliation.
[ . . . ] It is then perfectly possible to accept sincerely a drastic kind of a
universe from which the element of ‘seriousness’ is not to be expelled.
Whoso does so is, it seems to me, a genuine pragmatist.
James 1975–88 [1907], 141–2
It is this very same moral seriousness that I find essential to emphasize in
the contemporary discourse on evil. There is a sense in which our moral
life with other human beings in a world full of suffering is tragic: given
our finitude, we will never be able to fully overcome evil and suffering, yet
we must constantly try. James’s pragmatism is not only generally relevant
as a critical middle path solution to several controversies in contempo-
rary philosophy of religion, but also a promising move toward the kind
of antitheodicism I think we vitally need in any serious moral philosophy.
It may also keep our eyes open to the reality of the tragic dimension of
human life. Yet, even the notion of tragedy might lead us astray here
in something like a theodicist manner. Tragedies, though not themselves
theodicies, are meaningful and “deep” in a sense in which human real-
world evils and sufferings such as the Holocaust often are not. It is pre-
sumably better to speak about Jamesian melancholy—about the sick soul’s
fundamentally melancholic way of approaching ethics, and the world in
general.
Moreover, it must be kept in mind that James’s antitheodicy (and the
understanding of the problem of evil as a “frame”) emerges in the context
of developing pragmatism in general as a philosophy—not only as an ethi-
cal approach but as a philosophical orientation in general. In this context,
as is well known, James offers pragmatism as a critical middle ground
between “tough-minded” and “tender-minded” philosophies. Antitheod-
icy and melancholy are, thus, conditions for the adequacy of (pragmatist)
philosophizing as such.
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4. Rortyan ironism and Nineteen Eighty-Four
Having briefly defended a resolutely antitheodicist reading of James and
an antitheodicist way of developing pragmatism generally—as a philo-
sophical contribution to the discourse on evil, but also more comprehen-
sively as a contribution to the examination of the relations between ethics
and metaphysics—we should consider the way in which this antitheodi-
cism is both rooted in Kantian antitheodicism and threatened by a certain
kind of problematization of the notions of truth and reality that James’s
own pragmatism takes some crucial steps toward. In this context, we will
have to expand our horizon from James and Kant to Rorty’s neopragma-
tism and especially to Rorty’s treatment of George Orwell.
According to Rorty, famously, cruelty is the worst thing we do. This is,
one might suggest, another pragmatist version of the Jamesian principle
according to which we should always listen to the “cries of the wounded”.
There is a kind of holism involved in Rorty’s position, just like in James’s:
“don’t be cruel” could be regarded as a meta-principle governing all other
moral principles (and, to put it in a Kantian way, governing the choice
of all moral principles), yet itself (like all more specific principles, and
unlike the Kantian meta-principle, the categorical imperative) fallible and
revisable, even though it may be difficult or even impossible to imagine
how exactly it could fail—just like it is impossible to imagine, in the con-
text of Quinean holism, what it would really be like to falsify a logical
or mathematical principle.8 There are, pace Kant, no unconditional ideals
or principles, either for James or for Rorty, while both pragmatist philoso-
phers do operate with broader and more inclusive (as well as narrower
and less inclusive) moral views and principles. Whereas for James the
broadest imaginable principle seems to be the requirement to realize the
largest possible universe of good while carefully listening to the cries of
the wounded, for Rorty an analogous role is played by the liberal principle
of avoiding cruelty and realizing individual freedom as fully as possible.
All ethical requirements, including these, are contingent and in principle
fallible, as everything is contained in a holistic, revisable totality of our
on-going ethical thought and conversation. (Analogously, we may say, the
transcendental is contained in the empirical, and vice versa.)
In his essay on Orwell, Rorty—whose “protest” against mainstream an-
alytic philosophy is, we may say, much stronger than most other pragma-
8 According to Quine’s (1953) famous holism, logical and mathematical beliefs (or sen-
tences) are in principle on a par with empirical scientific beliefs (or sentences).
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tists’—rejects the realistic reading of Nineteen Eighty-Four, according to
which the book defends an objective notion of truth in the context of a
penetrating moral critique of the horrible and humiliating way in which
Winston is made to believe that two plus two equals five.9 Consistently
with his well-known position (if it can be regarded as a “position” at all),
Rorty (1989, 173) denies that “there are any plain moral facts out there
in the world, [ . . . ] any truths independent of language, [or] any neutral
ground on which to stand and argue that either torture or kindness are
preferable to the other”. Orwell’s significance lies in a novel redescrip-
tion of what is possible: he convinced us that “nothing in the nature of
truth, or man, or history” will block the conceivable scenario that “the
same developments which had made human equality technically possi-
ble might make endless slavery possible” (ibid., 175). Hence, O’Brien, the
torturer and “Party intellectual”, is Orwell’s key invention, and he, cru-
cially, offers no answer to O’Brien’s position: “He does not view O’Brien
as crazy, misguided, seduced by a mistaken theory, or blind to the moral
facts. He simply views him as dangerous and as possible” (ibid.,176).
The key idea here, according to Rorty, is that truth as such does not
matter: “[ . . . ] what matters is your ability to talk to other people about
what seems to you true, not what is in fact true” (ibid.).10 Famously, in
Nineteen Eighty-Four, Winston’s self is in a way destroyed as he is made to
believe that two plus two equals five and to utter “Do it to Julia!” when
faced with his worst fear, the rats. Rorty points out that this is something
he “could not utter sincerely and still be able to put himself back together”
(ibid., 179).
The notion of sincerity is central here, as it leads us to the way in which
Kant critically discusses theodicies in his 1791 essay, “U¨ber das Misslingen
aller philosophischen Versuche in der Theodicee” (“On the Miscarriage of
all Philosophical Trials in Theodicy”), a largely neglected short piece that
usually does not get the kind of attention that Kant’s more famous doc-
trine of “radical evil” does (not to speak of the main works of his critical
philosophy).11 I believe we should follow Kant in rejecting theodicies not
9 For the realistic reading, also directed against Rorty’s pragmatism, cf. e. g., van Inwagen
1993, 69; Mounce 1997, 211–8.
10 This is followed by the well-known Rortyan one-liner, “If we take care of freedom, truth
can take care of itself”.
11 The essay was first published in Berlinische Monatsschrift, September 1791, 194–225;
cf. Kant 1983 b [1791]. For an English translation, cf. Immanuel Kant, Religion and Rational
Theology, trans. and ed. Allen W. Wood and George Di Giovanni (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996), 20–37 (with the translator’s introduction at 21–3). In referencing,
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only for intellectual but also for ethical (and, therefore, religious) reasons;
indeed, James (as I have interpreted him above) is, in this sense, a Kan-
tian. As Richard Bernstein (2002, 3–4) points out in his introduction to
what is one of the most important contributions to the problem of evil in
the 21st century, Kant’s rejection of theodicies is a crucial part of his criti-
cal philosophy: insofar as theodicies aim at theoretical knowledge about
God, they are not merely contingent failures but, much more strongly,
impossible and must fail, given the limitations of human reason; on the
other hand, it is precisely by limiting the sphere of knowledge that Kant,
famously, makes room for faith. Kant, therefore, is “the modern philoso-
pher who initiates the inquiry into evil without explicit recourse to philo-
sophical theodicy” and hence also leads the way in our attempt to rethink
the meaning of evil and responsibility “after Auschwitz” (ibid., 4).12 Kant
writes about evil in a conceptual world entirely different from the one oc-
cupied by his most important predecessors, such as Leibniz. This Kantian
conceptual world is, if my argument in the earlier sections of this paper
is on the right track, shared by James. We may say that Kant’s antitheodi-
cism was transformed into a pragmatist antitheodicism by James.13
The details of Kant’s analysis of the failures of theodicies need not
concern us here. As I want to focus on the issue of truth, I must emphasize
the way in which Kant invokes the Book of Job as an example of the only
“honest” way of formulating a theodicy—which, for him, actually seems
to be an antitheodicy. Job’s key virtue, according to Kant, is his sincerity
(Aufrichtigkeit), which establishes “the preeminence of the honest man over
the religious flatterer in the divine verdict” (Kant 1983b [1791], 8:267):
Job speaks as he thinks, and with the courage with which he, as well
as every human being in his position, can well afford; his friends,
on the contrary, speak as if they were being secretly listened to by
the mighty one, over whose cause they are passing judgment, and
as if gaining his favor through their judgment were closer to their
heart than the truth. Their malice in pretending to assert things into
even though I am citing the English translation, the standard Akademie-Ausgabe numbering
will be used. For secondary literature focusing on the theodicy essay, cf. e. g., Brachtendorff
2002; Galbraith 2006.
12 For Bernstein’s insightful reading of Kant’s theory of radical evil, cf. Bernstein 2002,
chapter 1.
13 The reason I am making a short excursus to Kant’s antitheodicism in this section is that
we need to examine the Kantian notion of sincerity in order to critically evaluate the Rortyan
neopragmatist developments regarding truth and objectivity. For the significance of Kant for
the project of antitheodicism, see the much more comprehensive discussion in Kivisto¨ and
Pihlstro¨m 2016.
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which they yet must admit they have no insight, and in simulating a
conviction which they in fact do not have, contrasts with Job’s frank-
ness [ . . . ]. Ibid., 8:265–6.
For Kant, the leading feature in Job’s virtuous character is not, then, his
patience in suffering (as many traditional, particularly Christian, inter-
preters of the Book of Job might suggest), but his inner sincerity, integrity,
and honesty. Indeed, Job protests against his suffering in the poetic dia-
logues of the book; he does not simply endure his fate or quietly suffer,
but complains and insists on the injustice of his adversities. Thus, Job’s
honesty of heart, rather than his alleged patience, is his greatest virtue.
Toward the end of the essay, Kant discusses the moral evil of insinceri-
ty—of our tendency “to distort even inner declarations before [our] own
conscience”—as “in itself evil even if it harms no one” (ibid., 8:270). Thus,
he seems to be saying in so many words that speculative, rationalizing
theodicies—the kind of theodicies manifested by Job’s friends—are them-
selves exemplifications of evil. They are also evil in a very specific sense:
they do not acknowledge the Kantian—and more generally Enlighten-
ment—ideal of free, autonomous, and responsible thinking based on the
idea of inner truthfulness (which is something that we should see pragma-
tist philosophers like James and Rorty highly appreciating as well). They
are therefore revolts (not primarily against God but) against humanity it-
self, conceived in a Kantian way. We might even say that the insincerity
of theodicist thinking does not recognize the essential human capacity for
freedom and responsibility, for the kind of autonomous thinking that is
the very foundation of morality. It is not implausible, it seems to me,
to suggest that James could have sympathized with, or even implicitly
shared, this Kantian line of thought in his criticism of theodicies analyzed
above. For James, too, there is something ethically, fundamentally insin-
cere in theodicies. Theodicies, as we saw through some illustrative quo-
tations from Pragmatism, do not live up to the ideal of knowing the truth
instead of living in shades. Moreover, reflecting on what goes wrong in
our own tendencies to succumb to the temptations of theodicy (as Bern-
stein calls them in his discussion of Levinas) is a prime example of critical
yet pragmatic reflexivity at work.
A fundamental distinction between truth and falsity is, however, neces-
sary for the concepts of sincerity and truthfulness (Kantian Aufrichtigkeit),
and given the role these concepts play in Kantian antitheodicism, such a
distinction is necessary for the antitheodicist project generally as well, also
in its Jamesian pragmatist reincarnation. Now, insofar as Rorty’s pragma-
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tism carries Jamesian pragmatism into a certain kind of extreme, one is
left wondering whether there is any way to stop on the slippery slope
arguably leading from James to Rorty (and eventually bringing in, with
horror, Orwell’s O’Brien). Reality, shocking as it often is, must still be con-
trasted with something like unreality, while truth and truthfulness must
be contrasted not only with falsity but also with lying and self-deception,
and possibly other kinds of loss of sincerity and truthfulness that may
follow from the collapse of the truth vs. falsity distinction itself. What we
find here is the problem of realism in its existential dimensions. This is, ar-
guably, the core pragmatic meaning of the problem of realism—or even,
echoing the reading of Pragmatism presented above, an approach to the
problem of realism framed by the problem of evil.
Insofar as the distinction between truth and falsity collapses, as it does
in Nineteen Eighty-Four, the very project of antitheodicy, which (I believe
we may argue) depends on the Kantian notion of Aufrichtigkeit (sincer-
ity),14 becomes threatened. Truthfulness or sincerity itself collapses here.
Hence, this is another special message and problem of Orwell, an implicit
warning of his great novel: there is no theodicy available even in this
negative sense, no happy end or moral harmony available, even by going
through antitheodicism. Taking evil and suffering seriously entails acknowl-
edging that we constantly run the risk of losing whatever truthfulness we
might be capable of possessing, and of thereby losing the sincere attitude
to evil and suffering that antitheodicists like Kant and James have found
crucially important for an adequately (or even minimally) ethical attitude
to suffering. Thus, the Orwellian challenge (or warning) lies right here:
is there, or can there be, or can we at least imagine, such evil that makes
antitheodicy itself impossible by destroying the very possibility of Kantian
Aufrichtigkeit (by destroying the truth vs. falsity distinction that is neces-
sary for truthfulness or sincerity)? This fragility of antitheodicy, the fragility
of sincerity necessary for antitheodicy, is a dimension of the more general
fragility of the moral point of view; we can consider it a meta-antitheodicy.
By destroyingWinston’s capacity for sincerely uttering something and still
being able to “put himself back together”, O’Brien not only engages in evil
that lies (almost) beyond description and imagination, but also leads us
to imagine the possibility of evil that renders (Kantian) antitheodicy itself
impossible. This will then collapse the Jamesian antitheodicist approach
14 This is argued in some detail in Kivisto¨ and Pihlstro¨m 2016, chapter 5. In this context,
I cannot develop this argument at any more length, as important as it is for our overall
assessment of the prospects of pragmatist-cum-Kantian antitheodicism.
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as well, given that it starts from a kind of pragmatic softening of the no-
tion of objective truth culminating in the “truth happens to an idea” view
characteristic of James’s ethically grounded metaphysics.
5. Conclusion
Let me try to offer some ways of pulling the threads together on the basis
of our discussions of Kant, James, and Rorty. These concluding reflec-
tions will remain inconclusive, but the job of the pragmatist-cum-Kantian
antitheodicist will in any event continue.
It is important to realize that while James in my reading only resisted
certain metaphysically realistic forms of metaphysics, especially Hegelian
monistic absolute idealism (and corresponding metaphysical realisms),
without thereby abandoning metaphysics altogether (cf. Pihlstro¨m 2009),
Rorty’s reading of Orwell is deeply based on his rejection of all forms of
metaphysics. In his view, Orwell tells us that “whether our future rulers
are more like O’Brien or more like J. S.Mill does not depend [ . . . ] on
deep facts about human nature” or on any “large necessary truths about
human nature and its relation to truth and justice” but on “a lot of small
contingent facts” (Rorty 1989, 187–8). Now, this is hard to deny, at least in
a sense; various minor contingent facts have enormous influence on how
our world and societies develop. This is also a very important message of
Rortyan ironism in general: our firmest moral commitments, our “final vo-
cabularies”, are all historically contingent. But the worry is that, if we give
up (even pragmatically rearticulated) objective truth entirely, we will end
up giving up the very possibility of sincerity, too, and that is something
we need for resisting the future of all possible O’Briens’ (paradoxically)
theodicist newspeak seeking to justify evil, suffering, and torture. It is one
thing to accept, reasonably, historical contingency and to reject overblown
metaphysics of “deep facts about human nature”; it is quite another mat-
ter to give up even a minimal pragmatic sense of objective truth required
not only for sincerity but for the very possibility of sincerity (and, hence,
for the possibility of insincerity as well, because insincerity is possible
only insofar as sincerity is possible, and vice versa). This worry ought
to be constantly kept in mind by anyone sympathizing with the Jamesian
antitheodicist suggestion to apply the notion of pragmatic truth to the ac-
knowledgment of the reality of suffering. Therefore, I have spoken about
the problem of realism in its existential meaning.
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I am not saying that Rorty (or James) is wrong, or has a mistaken con-
ception of truth (or facts, or history, or anything). What I am saying is that
if Rorty is right (whatever it means to say this, given the disappearance, in
Rorty’s neopragmatism, of the distinction between being right and being
regarded as being right by one’s cultural peers), then we are in a bigger
trouble than we may have believed.15 Jamesian pragmatism seems to take
the correct, indeed vital, antitheodicist step in refusing to philosophically
justify evil and suffering. This step was initially made possible by Kant’s
antitheodicism and critical philosophy more generally. However, insofar
as Jamesian pragmatism develops into something like Rorty’s neoprag-
matism, which lets the notion of truth drop out as unimportant, the end
result is not only an insightful emphasis on historical contingency (and on
the role of literature in showing us fascinating, and dangerous, contingent
possibilities) but also the possible fragmentation of sincerity itself, which
seems to depend on a relatively robust distinction between truth and fal-
sity. Antitheodicy thus becomes fragmented through that fragmentation.
What this shows is, perhaps, a quasi-Rortyan point: Orwell is more
important, and O’Brien more dangerous, than we may have thought. But
it also shows that Rorty deprives us of certain linguistic, literary, and
philosophical resources that we might see Orwell as having equipped us
with. Pragmatism can maintain those resources only by being critical—
that is, Kantian. Only the critical path is open: this Kantian message
should be taken home by all pragmatists, and not only by pragmatists.16
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